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University of North Florida
Abstract
This paper examines Hegel’s description of mutual recognition in his Phenomenology
of Spirit. On this account, development of a self-consciousness occurs only alongside
another, separate and distinct self-consciousness. We find our identity and genuine
sense of selfhood through family ties, civil society, and the state. Apart from others,
we cease to exist—self-consciousness cannot be found in isolation. With this said,
many internal and external complications ensue from obtaining recognition, our
greatest desire, from another self which also seeks recognition. Hegel’s Master-Slave
dialectic is delineated along with the attainment of self-consciousness through
social and political spheres. The emphasis he places on intersubjective relations
of recognition for selfhood is compelling; however, his account is too cognitive
and political and thus fails to adequately resolve the inequitable power dynamic
at hand. Emotionality and friendship both transcend and dismantle the struggle
for recognition and should therefore receive more attention in Hegel’s account of
attaining recognition.

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel gives an account of self-consciousness and its
necessary antecedent: mutual recognition. The presence and development of
self-consciousness is a two-fold enterprise in which a singular self-concept is
accompanied by another, separate and distinct self-consciousness. Both are made
complete in the process of social life and interpersonal relationships, apart from
which they dismantle. Self-consciousness exists for itself, independently, but also for
the other and as a byproduct of the other, thus we identify the need for a mutually
recognizing being. In this paper, I will be evaluating this idea of mutual recognition in
relation to self-consciousness and selfhood, accounting for both descriptive concepts
and ethical obligations which ensue. I will identify the origin of desire, how this
dissatisfaction accompanying desire can be met, and the inequitable social relations
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which arise in response to the desired recognition or lack thereof. I will additionally
describe Hegel’s response to the inequitable master-slave, lordship-bondsman,
dialectic which arises and whether his interpretation and solution are sufficient.
Hegel’s claim is that through desire we obtain a sense of vitality in life and
that this very desire both reminds us and ensures that we are in fact spiritually
alive. Our ultimate desire is not a vague, materialistic concept. Rather, our general
dissatisfaction stems in part from lacking recognition—what we really want is to
be recognized with some particular esteem. We pursue our desires daily which is
the expression of our lives (Buchwalter 2020b, 11). We attempt to fulfil physical,
sexual, and materialistic needs necessary for self-preservation and happiness, the
underpinnings of which is the desire for recognition—to be fully known by another.
Apart from social life, we cannot receive recognition and thus our concept of self not
only remains incomplete, but nonexistent. Thus, we depend not on ourselves, but on
others to fulfil our deepest desire, which is where we truly come to life.
Following this notion, a concern arises as our ultimate desire cannot be
fulfilled independently, but necessarily requires another conscious being. We lose
the façade of independence, trading it for recognition of our reliance on another
being outside of ourselves with self-consciousness existing only alongside another,
independent self-consciousness (Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 92). This is a two-fold
process. In finding itself as another being, the self-consciousness loses itself, but in
losing itself within the other, it supersedes the other because it did not see the other
autonomously, but in the other, it saw itself (Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 92). Thus,
we can identify the methodology of recognition: that the other, independent being
must be superseded to become “certain of itself ” and it is through this process of
superseding the other, that it supersedes itself because the other is itself (Hegel &
Houlgate 2005, 92).
The supersession of otherness is, in fact, a return to self (Hegel & Houlgate
2005, 93). It is a relational movement between two parties, yet it is simultaneously
the action of oneself rather than two. Both are their own and the other’s. We see
this characterized in Hegel’s claim that “each sees the other do the same as it does;
each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does
only in so far as the other does the same.” (Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 93). The
essence of mutual recognition is exemplified in the action of double significance:
the self-consciousnesses recognize themselves recognizing the other and being
— 2 —

Mutual Recognition: The Struggle for Power and Domination

recognized, simultaneously. Self-consciousness is a “middle term” (Hegel &
Houlgate 2005, 93) which divides into two extremes, both “recognize themselves as
mutually recognizing each other” (Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 93).
This equitable recognition is fleeting, followed by a split of two opposing,
inequitable extremes (Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 93). Mutual recognition is
disregarded for an unbalanced acknowledgement of the other in which only one is
recognized and the other, only recognizing. Mutual recognition does not come easy
and once reciprocity has been abandoned, certainty of the other is abandoned along
with it. Thus, each is certain of itself, but not of the other and therefore, certainty
of itself is an illusion. Each wants to be for itself, but it is only through being for
the other and having the other be for them that being-for-self is plausible. One is
intertwined with the other and vice versa—apart from the other it ceases to be what
it knows itself to be and what it desires to be.
The temptation then arises to control the other and to make the other one’s own.
If our self-concept is rooted in the recognition and perception of another, the other’s
interpretation of us may conflict with our own perception of ourselves; our identity
may be challenged by the other, and undesirably so. To atone for this disparity
between the self-image we hope to portray and the other’s portrayal of us, we attempt
to control the other—thus controlling ourselves. One solution to this atonement
is to kill the other, “showing that [we are] not attached to any specific existence”
(Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 94). The underpinnings of the solution to kill the other is
rooted in our desire to control ourselves and to uphold our self-consciousness. On
the basis of this notion, “each seeks the death of the other” (Hegel & Houlgate 2005,
94). Although this solution is counterproductive in that following the death of the
other, we too die ourselves, dying alongside the other, it is necessary, nonetheless. The
staking of our life through the “life-and-death struggle” proves to be a necessary event
in which we gain freedom (Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 94). Without this struggle for
self-certainty we not only fail to gain freedom, but we also forfeit the recognition of
independence from the other. It is in putting our life at stake and simultaneously the
life of our counterpart that we establish our independence.
The temptation to kill the other is fleeting; both extremes put away their attempt
to destroy the other’s existence and instead choose to favor their own existence. Along
with this, they forfeit their desire to live independently and to “have an existence of
their own” (Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 95). Both understand that a life intertwined
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with the other is better than no life at all. A second solution then arises: a master-slave,
lordship-bondsman relationship in which both continue to exist, inequitably. The
stronger attempts to control the weaker, making the weaker their slave (Buchwalter
2020b, 14). The Lord exists for himself whereas the slave exists to serve the Lord; he
holds the slave in bondage and finds his identity through the slave. This solution is
also insufficient in that the Lord obtains only an imposed, forced sense of recognition
from the slave. The slave does not provide the master with real, genuine recognition,
but only the illusion of recognition, one which is not sincere and thus does not satisfy
(Buchwalter 2020b, 14).
Furthermore, while the slave was once the sole dependent in the relationship, the
master soon becomes dependent on the slave. The Lord’s reliance on the bondsman is
his downfall—he loses his independence and becomes dependent on the bondsman
for identity. Apart from the slave, the master loses himself. His effort to receive
recognition from the slave and thus, a sense of identity rooted in self-consciousness,
makes him gradually dependent on the slave. The slave does all the work while the
master reaps all the benefit; he becomes complacent, unskilled, and incompetent on
his own (Buchwalter 2020b, 14). The master’s newly developed dependence on the
slave alters the power dynamics: the master now becomes a dependent slave, whereas
the slave becomes a skilled, independent being, finding power through work. The
slave, although seemingly forced into the mold of a service worker, gains identity,
wisdom, and power in his craft. The slave recognizes that the world around both
himself and the master is in fact their own creation and they played a part in its
existence as they know it. It is through being objectified and belittled that the slave
gains independence and consciousness (Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 97). It is by using
the slave as a means to an end that the master becomes enslaved to the slave.
Although the slave’s newly gained independence comes through work forced upon
him by the master, rather than his own work, he still has obtained a self-recognition
which the master does not have access to (Buchwalter 2020b, 14). Hegel wants to
claim that it is through work that “the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly
is” (Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 97). It is through his labor that he expresses himself.
The slave has gained that which is unavailable to the master; however, he finds no
enjoyment or meaning through his labor. He works on a craft that is not his own; it
is foreign and meaningless to him. The slave’s labor is alienated labor and the result is
a sense of disconnect from the world in which he lives and works. It is through this
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alienated work that the slave “acquires a mind of his own” (Hegel & Houlgate 2005,
98), yet the price he pays is a life of disengagement and detachment.
The result is the idea of Stoicism: the slave obtains a newly found sense of power
and peace in his death. The slave recognizes that although he possesses little power
over his craft, he alone possesses the ultimate power and control over his existence
(or lack thereof ). It is through his death that independence and autonomy can be
attained. This is an independence that the slave holds in his own hands; the master
cannot take it from him. This ultimate recognition of the control he possesses over
his life and death, grants him both freedom and determinism (Buchwalter 2020b,
15). Assertion of the slave’s independence and autonomy are only exemplified
through death—the slave is free and determined only through disregarding his life.
Following Stoicism, we are led to a new and final dialectic bearing on the struggle
for recognition. Although the slave finds solace and power in his own death, this
resolution is problematic, nonetheless. The master-slave dialectic is not fully resolved:
the slave only finds solace in his own death and the master is wholly dependent on
the slave. Stoic consciousness does little to atone for the inequitable power dynamic
and struggle for recognition which does not embody full, genuine recognition.
Hegel’s claim is that the interests of both the master and slave are accounted for only
when both consider the other as an end in themselves rather than as a means to
self-fulfillment. Both the master and slave must forsake self-consciousness which
cannot see the other as an independent being, but always sees the other only for itself.
Self-consciousness must be disregarded for a new standpoint: the standpoint of
spirit (Buchwalter 2020b, 15). This is not intended to be a standard religious spirit,
but a new religious spirit, a political spirit—one in which separation from the other is
not an act of rejection of the other or of the self (Buchwalter 2020a, 6). Instead, this
spirit is the component of a fulfilled completeness. On this account, each is able to
view themselves as a complete whole emancipated from the other. This emancipation
and completion enable each to view the other as an end in himself rather than an
object to be controlled and objectified. At the heart of the standpoint of spirit is
the idea of a political community in which independence, dependence, and most
importantly, interdependence, are not at odds, but are simply conditions of life.
Rather than attempt to control, modify, and alter our relations with another, we must
accept them as necessary components of life, finding freedom in interdependence.
Hegel further claims that the individual finds solace within history, recognizing
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their individuality as a part of a larger, grander historical context. Rather than being
solely enmeshed in another, the individual is enmeshed in history, playing a role in
something larger than themselves and larger than the other.
Hegel’s philosophy possesses a unique account of reason which branches away
from the former narrow, cognitive ideologies which scientific Enlightenment thought
perpetuated (Buchwalter 2020a, 11). Instead, he provides a dialectical framework
of reason based on the reconciliation of opposites (Buchwalter 2020a, 10). This
reconciliation manifests in the dialectic colloquialism, “as well as”, insinuating that
the preservation and unification of two contradictions, both reason and emotion,
can exist within one philosophical framework. His account is distinguished from
his predecessors and other counterparts in that rather than accepting a dualistic,
intellectualist account of reason, he puts forth a synthetic account allowing for the
upholding of two contradictory truths—reason and emotion can, in fact, coincide.
With that said, harmony and the surmounting of oppositions is located in and
largely credited to reason, which we see highlighted in the account on the ethical life
(Buchwalter 2020a, 6).
Following the former notion of Hegel’s dialectic philosophy, resolution to the
master-slave dialectic and ultimate obtainment of mutual recognition is rooted in
both reason and emotion as “necessary dichotomy is One factor of life” (Hegel &
Houlgate 2005, 41). Accounted for is an interaction, “a give and take” between
contradictions as “a way of gaining truth” (Buchwalter 2020a, 12). With this said,
Hegel places little emphasis on the emotional aspects necessary for recognition with
greater importance given to a rational, reasonable account of mutual recognition.
Although emotionality is not excluded from his account of the ethical life, the
emotional account—reflected in love, friendship, and family—takes an inferior
position and are superseded by civil society and the state (Buchwalter 2020c, 2). The
emotional dimensions of recognition such as love, friendship, family, and pursuits
of compassion, although incorporated, are not sufficiently touched on. Rather, he
places primary emphasis on reason alone. In the Philosophy of Right, he delineates
considerations of philosophy as the “exploration of the rational” claiming that “what
is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational” (Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 178).
This claim prefaces the importance of rationalism which Hegel soon emphasizes.
This focus on rationalism is unsurprising as his description of the ethical
life, although accounting for, minimizes the importance of a “romantic focus on
— 6 —

Mutual Recognition: The Struggle for Power and Domination

emotionality” (Buchwalter 2020c, 2). Instead, the majority of acknowledgement and
credit are given to rationale and cognitive components found within civil society and
the state. This inequitable reconciliation of both reason and emotion is highlighted
in Hegel’s emphasis on the importance of public duty over familial ties (Buchwalter
2020c, 10-11). This bias in favor of reason and rationale over emotionality,
insufficiently acknowledges necessary components from the family life which are
necessary for mutual recognition: love, intimacy, and friendship.
The family, the first stage in the ethical life, exemplifies the individual’s first
experience within a social sphere. There we learn to value the other and our affiliation
to the group. This social bond is immediate and unreflective; it is the natural starting
point which allows us to develop social norms and collectivist ideologies. The family
is connected through love, which starts with marriage, and marriage is not defined
within the realm of a contract, but through a loving commitment to the other
(Buchwalter 2020c, 10). The family is based on principles of both love and affection
and the individual becomes an active participant within the group (Buchwalter 2020c,
12). Thus, the first social institution we exist within is the family; it is natural, organic,
and unifies our concept of individuality and community. Within the family stage of
the ethical life, Hegel showcases emotionality and affectivity as essential components
of the political community and thus mutual recognition. However, the family stage,
although maintained, is eventually superseded by civil society and the state.
The state brings the trilogy of the ethical life to a close and freedom through
social institutions is ascertained. Membership within the state is more central than
individual pursuits as “the individual is first and foremost a member of community”
(Buchwalter 2020c, 10). It is through political community that identity is achieved.
According to Hegel, subordination to the whole is a necessary condition for
freedom, thus the individual must prioritize public duty and the good of the whole
(Buchwalter 2020c, 11). Within the state, however, individual private interests
are not completely disregarded. The family, although not a principle of the state,
is referenced in the attempt to create a family-like political organism (Buchwalter
2020c, 15). This allows each citizen to feel like they are a part of something greater
than themselves. The individual is no longer an alienated being but possesses an
inherent membership which cannot be retracted.
Within Hegel’s account of the ethical life, which gives way to freedom through
social institutions, the individual commits to the public good while preserving his
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individualism. Hegel exemplifies the former notion in the statement, “The state is the
actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom requires personal individuality”
(Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 381). Although the state completes the ethical life, the
family and civil society are both combined and preserved, nonetheless (Hegel &
Houlgate 2005, 382). Thus, freedom and mutual recognition are achieved through
emotionality, cognition, and rationale with the former being more important
than the latter. Rationality from the state ties everything together in the highest
sophistication with emotionality from the family playing a less prominent role in
freedom and recognition.
Thus, Hegel’s resolution for the struggle of self-consciousness through the
master-slave dialectic places too much importance on rationality and not enough on
emotionality. He provides a solid framework of communal importance and group
cohesivity; however, it remains somewhat cold and narrow (although much less than
the prevalent analytic, dualistic Enlightenment thought). The process of coming to be
what one already is and fulfilling our desire for recognition is twofold—Hegel would
agree. Siding with Hegel, we must recognize our place within history and our place
within the political community where we act in a way that promotes the good of the
group—that is, universally altruistic. Yet, we must place equal importance on the
family life and other emotionally motivated pursuits for recognition.
For Hegel, political community supersedes individuality and recognition can
be extended and received universally through the whole (Buchwalter 2020c, 15).
Strangers are united globally and this unification allows self-identity to be ascertained
by and given to those whom we have no meaningful relationship with—at least
apart from the group. Although this rational concept of recognition through the
state seems to address an inherent existing selfhood present within the collective
group and our responsibility towards them, many gaps remain in the pursuit
of complete recognition. The development of selfhood and identity necessarily
requires recognition from others, yet simply existing alongside another in the same
community is not sufficient. Selfhood in otherness is only fully grasped when a
sense of vulnerability, intimacy, or love is present between two people; otherwise
recognition remains distant and remote—a façade rather than genuine and real.
It is not enough to receive selfhood solely through the state’s political community.
Meaningful, intimate bonds are necessary for mutual recognition, with just as much
importance placed on individualism as with collectivism.
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As previously established, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel addresses the freedom
we possess “in friendship and love” (Hegel & Houlgate 2005, 182). Yet, public
duty is ultimately favored over family-based principles which are the ultimate
representation of unconditional love and intimacy (Buchwalter 2020c, 15). The
family, unreflective and immediate, is an important component of the ethical life,
yet it remains inferior to the state. The family is connected through emotional and
instinctive ties whereas the state represents mediation, reflectivity, and cognition.
Ultimately, the state supersedes the family. One finds identity and relationship
through the public sphere of the state. With this said, relationships and self-identity
with emotion alone are unfulfilling—they cannot satisfy our desire for recognition
in full. According to Hegel’s account of the ethical life, the state supersedes the
family; however, the family life should play an equal or greater role in freedom and
recognition to that of the state and accordingly, should receive such recognition.
Intimacy and love are no less important in the obtainment of recognition than public
duty and community.
We must know others intimately in order to appreciate their existence and our
existence in affiliation to them. To fully recognize the other as an autonomous
individual with hopes, dreams, and desires of their own, we must spend time in their
presence, creating memories and bonds. It is impossible to appreciate dependence,
independence, and interdependence within relationships unless we know the other
for who they are and not for who they may appear to be prima facie. I can recognize a
stranger as an autonomous being, yet it is impossible for me to separate myself from
them and the service they can offer me (or vice versa) unless I know them on a deeper
level. In all crafts and acts of service that we take part in and benefit from on a daily
basis, we seldom experience the service worker for who they are outside of their job.
Thus, we cannot fully grasp the concept of their independence apart from us. Within
our acts of service and servitude, we cannot fully grasp those we are serving as they
are, apart from us. We must know the other and experience the other outside of our
craft in order to grant them and ourselves full recognition as separate entities.
Obtaining recognition and identity from others who don’t actually know us,
but only know us as they perceive us, and not necessarily for who we really are,
is infeasible. Another’s perception of us may be faulty as we are not entirely what
we appear to others. There are pieces of us which can only be known by us and
those we choose to confide in; these characteristics can never be recognized by one
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who is not aware of them. Wrong and flawed first impressions are more common
than not. Accordingly, recognition given from a flawed impression is recognition
to a being who does not entirely exist. Recognition of an imagined identity or
wrongfully perceived identity is recognition of a semblance, not a self. However,
intimacy, vulnerability, and exposure transcend the constraints that impede genuine
recognition, allowing for the true self to be recognized rather than the aura of a self.
This act of disclosing oneself to others occurs through friendships, family ties, and
intimate relationships. Through loving the other and seeing them as they are, we are
able to give and receive the recognition we desire above all else. Recognition from
those who we do not know and who do not know us is unfulfilling—a vain and
vapid pursuit. Yet, recognition from those who know us in full, the good and the
bad, is meaningful and thus possesses greater merit.
It is through love and friendship that genuine selfhood is established. This
further enables the emancipation from an inequitable power dynamic to a mutual
recognition. Selfhood in otherness allows each to view the other as an end in
themselves rather than a means to an end. Through connection we view our
counterpart not as something to be manipulated in order to extract recognition
from, but as an independent, autonomous being. Through loving bonds, we are able
to further establish an identity in relation to our counterpart while simultaneously
upholding their true essence, recognizing them in return.
In this respect, however, a problem arises as friendships are often subjective and
narrowly self-interested. We seek out friendships because they add quality to our
lives and allow us to obtain our ultimate desire of recognition. Thus, a struggle for
power may once again ensue. Seldom do we choose friendships which do not serve
us in some manner or simultaneously benefit us in some dimension. One may argue
that we most commonly seek out friendships with those who resemble us and share
our same beliefs, desires, dreams, and interests. These common interests which, at
the core, are the foundation of most friendships, may degenerate into self-love, thus
perpetuating the struggle for power and domination. We may seek out friendships
with those whose lives mirror our own in the attempt to once again regrasp control
over our own self; the other becomes a means to an end and the struggle for power
resurfaces. In reality, friendships may serve as a method of self-gratification simply
masked as love and affection. The underpinnings of such relationships may be
self-interested and self-serving rather than intersubjective. Therefore, the argument
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against a strong emphasis on emotionality is that, although genuine community
could be understood through a framework of love and friendship, mutual
recognition must also involve interaction with strangers to avoid the pitfall of narrow
egoism. Intersubjectivity may only exist within unbiased, rational relationships.
Despite this claim that friendship and love may breed or degenerate into self-love
rather than intersubjectivity, any friendship which degenerates into self-love is not true
friendship, but the façade of friendship and, therefore, is no longer applicable to this
claim of degeneration. True friendship is not self-serving. Although all unanimously
benefit from loving friendships and partnerships, at the heart of it, true, loving
relationships continuously seek the interest of the other. Nonetheless, relationships
do exist in which individuals are focused on the self above all else, but these are not
friendships nor are they loving and should not be confused as such.
Furthermore, many loving relationships exist in which the individuals present are
not united by similar interests. Although we may attempt to seek out relationships
with those who reflect our own beliefs, the most genuine and pure relationships are
those which spontaneously arise over time; through intimacy, we grow to love the
other for who they are and not for what common interest exists. We see past the
other’s differences from us, peering into the heart of their true self. We find solace not
in sameness, but by the other’s consolation, trust, and care; two individuals may have
little to nothing in common and yet still be comforted by the union present between
them. In fact, the notion that opposites attract, those who complement rather than
mirror the other, seems to contradict the notion that friendships are solely rooted
in similarities between individuals. Rather, the best and most genuine relationships
thrive when differences between individuals exist which challenge them both to either
refine their own beliefs, thus further finding certainty and self-realization within
them, or modify them accordingly.
In line with Hegel’s dialectic philosophy, love and friendship are both the
acquisition of self-fulfillment and the giving of self-fulfillment (Buchwalter 2020a, 14).
Love is a speculative dialectic. It is the act of fulfilling another’s desires while vicariously
achieving self-fulfillment in equal measure. The assertation of self-benefitting measures
do not therefore imply that degeneration into self-love will ensue, thus further
perpetuating the struggle of power and domination. Instead, the love given balances
out the love received, eliminating the need to wage war against the other or against the
self. Harmony is produced from the combination of opposition and what is gained
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stems in part from “the unity in terms of their opposition” (Hegel & Houlgate 2005,
99). While narrow egoism becomes a barrier to itself, intersubjectivity becomes the
foundation for mutual recognition.
Relations of recognition are thus not inherently life and death struggles—we can
escape the modes of power and domination, yet this escape does not come easy. It
requires that we come outside of ourselves and actively attempt to see the other for
who they are. This demands effort on our part, effort to get to know the other and
to remain open to intimate relationships. It requires that we put aside egocentric
notions that the world and others exist for us. Instead we exist together, and our
needs do not triumph over the needs of others. Furthermore, it requires that we
remain open and genuine, allowing ourselves to be understood by our counterparts
so that they too can recognize our independence from them. On this account, reason
and emotion work in unison and share equal bearing in the pursuit and attainment
of mutual recognition—neither is superior nor inferior to the other. Hegel and
I agree that “things cannot be conceived without reference to what is opposite”;
however, it is also necessary that opposites equally reference one another (Buchwalter
2020a, 12). In the obtainment of mutual recognition (our ultimate desire) emotional
dimensions must receive more credit than Hegel gives. It is through vulnerability and
intimacy we are able to put cease to relationships of power and domination.
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